RECENT COMPARATIVE STUDIES ON HYBRID REGIMES have pointed out that the capacity of authoritarian states to accommodate societal challenges is largely determined by their power to engineer a viable governing coalition (or a governing party) with extensive networks of mass organizations and strong activist bases.
1 From this perspective, the post-colonial Hong Kong state offers an interesting case study to validate this theory in the East Asian context. Since the handover of sovereignty in 1997, Hong Kong has evolved into a hybrid regime featuring a limited electoral franchise and strong civil liberties, as well as an increasingly active civil society. Despite the tremendous political changes over the past decades, the post-colonial state still mainly relies on its traditional allies in the business sector to mediate state-society relations. Nevertheless, because of the erosion of the mediating role of the business elites, the state-business alliance as inherited from its colonial predecessor can no longer furnish the post-colonial state with sufficient capacity to accommodate the challenges of civil society activism, thereby plunging it into a political quagmire of state-society conflicts. Drawing upon Levitsky and Way's theories on hybrid regimes, this paper puts forward a state-centric perspective to account for the governance crisis in post-colonial Hong Kong.
The remainder of this article is divided into five sections. Section One briefly reviews the concepts of hybrid regimes and Levitsky and Way's theories on governing coalition building in authoritarian states. Section Two traces the evolution of Hong Kong's hybrid regime. Section Three discusses the rise of civil society activism in post-colonial Hong Kong. Section Four examines the vulnerabilities of the state-business alliance in accommodating the challenges of civil society activism. The conclusion of this paper articulates a state-centric perspective to understand Hong Kong's governance crisis after 1997.
GOVERNING COALITION BUILDING IN HYBRID REG IMES
The Capacity of Authoritarian Incumbents to Accommodate
Societal Challenges
In recent years, there have been increasing discussions on the notion of ''hybrid regimes,'' which by definition combines both democratic and authoritarian elements.
2 This new wave of scholarly attention is attributable to the fact that the number of hybrid regimes is growing rapidly. According to Freedom in the World 2013 published by Freedom House, 3 58 out of the 195 countries around the globe could be considered ''Partly Free'' hybrid regimes 4 (which feature both limited political rights and civil liberties), representing 30% of the world's countries and covering about 23% of the world population. The notion of hybrid regimes is built upon the understanding that competitive election is a necessary but not sufficient condition for democracy.
5
From this perspective, democracies should not only be defined as a system of competitive and regular elections but should also encompass liberalized political participation and the protection of civil rights. Following Robert Dahl's classical theories of polyarchies, theorists of hybrid regimes considered competitive elections and civil liberties to be the two basic dimensions of modern democracy. Only when both are present can such a political regime be categorized as ''full democracy,'' while a regime should be classified as ''full authoritarianism'' when neither dimension exists. Between these two opposite poles of full democracy and full authoritarianism, there are two typical forms of hybrid regimes, namely, ''liberal authoritarianism'' (also known as ''semi-authoritarianism'') and ''electoral authoritarianism'' (also known as ''semi-democracy'').
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Comparative political studies have long recognized that the coexistence of democratic and authoritarian elements within a single political regime would usually be an inherent source of political conflict.
7 In this connection, much of the hybrid regime literature in the 1990s put emphasis on discussing the role of opposition forces in undermining the governance and stability of authoritarian regimes. 8 In other words, the 1990s literature is fundamentally an opposition-centered explanation of the politics of hybrid regimes, assuming that they are by nature transitional, moving toward democratic transition because of the presence of opposition movements.
9
The latest comparative studies on hybrid regimes, however, indicate that overemphasis on the role of opposition forces means, in effect, looking at one side of the coin while overlooking the other. The 1990s literature basically ignored the considerable variation in the capacity of authoritarian states to accommodate and resist opposition challenges. In their comparative study Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War, Levitsky and Way examined the trajectories of 37 hybrid regimes in the post-Cold War era and found that hybrid regimes did not uniformly democratize, as assumed in the 1990s literature. Rather, Levitsky and Way's empirical studies indicated that these authoritarian governments have followed three broad regime pathways:
14 have democratized (with authoritarian regimes removed and democratic ones firmly established, including Mexico, Peru, Serbia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovakia, and Taiwan); 12 are seen as unstable authoritarianisms (authoritarian incumbents removed from power but replaced by new ones, e.g., Albania, Georgia, Haiti, and Senegal); or the remaining 11 cases are stable authoritarianisms (authoritarian regimes remain stable and are effective in accommodating the challenges of opposition forces, e.g., Armenia, Cambodia, Cameroon, Malaysia, Russia, and Zimbabwe).
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According to the cross-national studies conducted by Levitsky and Way, such diversity of regime outcomes may be explained by the varying capacity of authoritarian states to accommodate opposition challenges.
11 Unlike autocratic rulers in full authoritarian systems, authoritarian incumbents in hybrid regimes need to manage a number of actors that challenge their governance, including opposition parties, media, judges, and civil society groups in 10. Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, pp. 20-22. 11. Apart from the strength of the authoritarian regimes in resisting opposition challenges (domestic variable), Levitsky and Way analyzed that the different regime trajectories could also be explained by the regimes' linkages with the West (international variable). According to them, ''Western leverage'' (the power of the West to use threat, conditionality, and other forms of pressure to punish the authoritarian regimes) and ''linkages to the West'' (political; economic; technocratic; social and diplomatic ties; and cross-border flow of capital, people, information, goods, and services) will raise the cost of maintaining the authoritarian regimes, and the authoritarian incumbents will be more likely to cede power to democratic reforms. When ties to the West are less extensive, international pressure for democratization will be weaker, and the domestic variable (the strength of the authoritarian incumbents) will be weighted more heavily. For the purpose of this article, we focus on discussing the domestic variable, which is more closely relevant and applicable to Hong Kong's contexts. different arenas of contestation (election, legislatures, and courts). To sustain their regimes, authoritarian incumbents must put in place an organizational machinery, usually in the form of a governing party or governing coalition, for managing different political challenges. The authors' studies show that where authoritarian incumbents are supported by strong governing party organizations, the incumbents are more likely to enhance elite cohesion, win elections, and maintain control over the legislative process, even amid strong opposition challenges. When the authoritarian incumbents lack organizational tools and the governing parties or coalitions are generally weak, they are more likely to fall, despite the weakness of opposition movements.
12
Levitsky and Way concluded that authoritarian incumbents supported by well-organized governing parties or governing coalition have a stronger capacity to overcome the inherent instabilities of hybrid regimes.
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THE POLITICS OF HYBRID REGIMES IN HONG KONG: BEFORE AND AFTER 1997
In the context of comparative studies, Hong Kong is an interesting case of a hybrid regime. In the colonial era, the British administration entrenched a liberal authoritarian regime in the city-state: Political powers were concentrated in the hands of the colonial state headed by the governor, and the people of Hong Kong were denied the rights to choose their own government though democratic elections. Nonetheless, a high level of civil liberties, on a par with many Western democratic regimes, was in place for many decades. 14 By maintaining a high degree of civil liberties and injecting some limited elements of democratic elections, Hong Kong's experience is unique in comparative studies and can be classified as a particular type of hybrid regime: Post-colonial Hong Kong is fundamentally a liberal authoritarian regime featuring some electoral authoritarian elements.
15
The academic questions here are as follows: does Hong Kong, as a particular type of hybrid regime, experience the same inherent risk of political conflict commonly found in other hybrid regimes? If Hong Kong is seen to experience political rivalries and a crisis of governance, are these problems closely connected to the post-colonial state's failure in building governing coalitions? As noted above, the post-colonial state has had to contend with waves of civil society activism and is mired in a series of state-society conflicts. Before offering and elaborating on a state-centric perspective to explain this rise in state-society conflicts, we must first review the development of civil society in recent years.
THE RISE OF SOCIETAL CHALLENGES: WAVES OF CIVIL SOCIETY ACTI VISM
As a matter of fact, Hong Kong's civil society remained underdeveloped for much of the British colonial period. This stemmed mostly from the ''refugee mentality'' of the local population, which spawned only a low level of political mobilization and minimal popular expectations of the government. 16 Only after the 1970s did local civil society become more active. With growing wealth and rapid socioeconomic development, Hong Kong people began to develop a stronger sense of local identity that replaced the previous immigrant-refugee mentality. People's aspiring political expectations resulted in the rise of pressure group politics and incoming waves of social movements focused, for example, on anti-corruption issues and the promotion of Chinese as an official language.
17
The real turning points spurring the rapid expansion of civil society activism were the Sino-British negotiations over the future of Hong Kong in 1982-84, and the June 4 Incident in China in 1989. These political controversies induced public participation in politics. With the rising political awareness of the Hong Kong people, the whole society became rapidly politicized. Research indicates that starting from the 1980s, Hong Kong people have become more active in pressing the government for an improved quality of life and for political and civic rights, resulting in a much higher incidence of social conflict than previously.
18
The wave of civil society activism was further intensified after 1997. The political slogan ''Hong Kong's People Ruling Hong Kong'' has, by intention or default, inspired the once-reticent public to make demands on the HKSAR government. The rise of civil society activism marked another important milestone in 2003 with July 1 protest rallies.
19 In their wake, Hong Kong people say they generally feel ''empowered and confident''; civil society has been galvanized over various policy advocacy activities.
20
The rise of civil society activism in recent years can be illustrated in four major aspects:
1. Expansion of the number of civil society groups and social protests:
Statistics show that from 2001-12, the number of civil society groups grew by 119.5% from 13,910 to 30,531; concurrently, the number of social demonstrations tended to rise (see Figure 1 ). 19. In 2003, the Tung Chee-hwa administration introduced a national security bill in accordance with Article 23 of the Basic Law. The bill was seen by democrats and civil society activists as an attempt to restrict civil liberties. The relevant political controversies had finally brought about boiling public anger and prompted over half a million Hong Kong people to march in protest against the Tung administration on July 1, 2003. 3. Expansion of the extent of citizen participation: Nowadays, citizen participation in local politics is no longer limited to the traditional professional sectors (e.g., lawyers, accountants, doctors, social workers, and teachers) but also encompasses mobilized ordinary citizens from different sectors (e.g., truck drivers, poultry workers, residents of urban communities, and young people). 22. Two notable examples were the campaign for protecting Victoria Harbor and the setting up of the H15 Concern Group. In the former case, a group of private citizens joined hands to protest against the further reclamation of Victoria Harbor for land. In the latter case, a group of housewives and ordinary residents with little political experience joined together to establish the H15 Concern Group, demanding participation in the Wanchai urban renewal project. For details, see Wai-man Lam and Irene Tong, ''Civil Society and NGOs,'' in ibid., pp. 135-54. 4 . Expansion of the civil society policy agenda: Apart from traditional social policy areas such as housing, health care, and social welfare, civil society organizations increasingly pay attention to other policy areas such as environmental protection, culture, heritage protection, town planning, and urban renewal.
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SIMILA RLY IN THE STATE-BUSINESS ALLIANCE, DIFFEREN T POLITI CAL OUT COMES Erosion of the Intermediary Role of Business Elites after 1997
The rise of civil society activism has posed unprecedented challenges to the post-colonial state after 1997. Many local political scientists have already pointed out that nowadays Hong Kong civil society has become more active in challenging the governance of the post-colonial state, making it increasingly difficult to establish broad societal acceptance of government policies.
24
The Star Ferry Pier episode in 2006 was one of the cases most frequently cited by local scholars in illustrating how the waves of civil society activism have undermined governance. 25. As part of the Central Reclamation Phase III Project, the Star Ferry clock tower would be demolished. The government had followed the due process of public consultation by consulting the Legislative Council, District Council, and Antiquities Advisory Board, and the plan did not meet with strong opposition. Still, demolition work was blocked in December 2006 when a group of While increasing challenges from civil society have undoubtedly created new governance problems for the post-colonial state as pointed out in the existing literature, one important question remains unanswered: Why does the post-colonial state fail to accommodate the challenges of civil society? In spite of its rapid expansion in recent years, it should be fair to say that civil society in Hong Kong is still far from having developed into full-fledged political society. Its mobilization power is still constrained by many factors such as inadequate financial and manpower resources, internal divisions, and the depoliticized values of Hong Kong people.
26 To use the words of Levitsky and Way, why does the authoritarian house of the post-colonial state fail to mediate the political challenges of a civil society that is not really vigorous by nature?
Moving beyond the existing opposition-centered explanation to adopt a state-centric perspective to re-examine the relationship, the answer is certainly related to the failure to build a viable governing coalition in the HKSAR era. Because the business sector has become increasingly disconnected from the local community since the handover, co-opted business elites are failing to fulfill their earlier role as intermediaries bridging the gap between the post-colonial state and the local community. As a consequence, the post-colonial state can no longer rely on its traditional political alliance with the business sector to maintain governance and accommodate the challenges of civil society.
The Intermediary Role of Business Elites in Colonial Hong Kong
In pre-1997 Hong Kong, the existence of a political alliance between the colonial state and the business sector was widely seen by academics as the foundation of effective governance. 27 The most notable feature of this alliance -protesters stormed the construction site. This incident, which spurred widespread political controversy, forced the government to review its built-heritage conservation policy. Following this incident, the HKSAR government launched a public consultation exercise and committed to expand the current built-heritage assessment criteria by incorporating the element of ''collective memory. ' namely, the Executive Council (which functioned as the governor's cabinet), the Legislative Council (which acted as the legislative arm of the colonial state), and other advisory committees (see Table 1 ).
Thanks to the intermediary role of co-opted business elites in the pre-1997 era, the state-business alliance effectively furnished the colonial state with a strong capacity to mediate state-society relations. In the colonial era, successful business persons, particularly local Chinese capitalists, were widely seen as the ''natural leaders'' of the community.
29 Their leadership status was built upon their active participation in district organizations, dialect groups, trade associations, or charity groups. This intermediary role of local Chinese capitalists was best illustrated by the case of the Tung Wah Hospital. Comprising the most prestigious local Chinese capitalists, the directors of the Tung Wah Hospital Committee were widely recognized by both the public and the colonial state as representatives of the Chinese community. Given their social standing and official recognition, Tung Wah Hospital served as much more than a provider of welfare and medical services. It was in fact a ''civic center'' whose directors mediated issues of public concern such as municipal services, law and order, and the needs of local facilities. The directors brought matters to the government's attention, thus effectively functioning as a nexus of interaction between the colonial state and the local Chinese community.
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The leadership of the industrial and business elites within the community enabled them to function as an effective link between the colonial state and the Chinese population, giving rise to a unique form of ''collaborative colonialism.'' 31 The business elites gave the colonial state two valuable assets in terms of mediating state-society relations. First, by co-opting prominent Chinese business persons into the advisory system, the colonial state enhanced its communication with the broader community while showing respect toward the local Chinese, thus forging a needed social support base for government policies.
32 Second, by forming collaborative partnerships with business notables, the colonial state could draw on their community networks and resources to defend the colonial regime and accommodate social challenges in times of serious unrest. recruiting hundreds of volunteers to maintain essential public services. In the 1967 riots, co-opted business elites stood firmly behind Governor David Trench and mobilized hundreds of business, professional, and community groups to pledge their support to the colonial government.
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The Erosion of the Intermediary Role of Business Elites in Post-colonial Hong Kong
The political formula of maintaining governance through a state-business alliance was subsequently followed by the incoming sovereign state, the Chinese government, as the foundation of the HKSAR political order. In the 1980s, when Beijing leaders decided to resume Chinese sovereignty in Hong Kong under the framework of ''one country, two systems,'' their stated intention was to maintain institutional continuity in the territory by preserving the British colonial model of governance after 1997. 34 In this connection, the grand strategy of the Chinese government was to leave the colonial state/ business alliance largely intact after the handover. Beijing leaders considered it necessary to maintain the pivotal position of the local capitalists in the future HKSAR governance system. 36. Under Article 56 of the Basic Law, the Executive Council is an organ for assisting the Chief Executive in policy making. All major policy decisions are in principle made by ''the Chief Executive Development, 37 and the Central Policy Unit, 38 showed that business elites have always held majority seats in the HKSAR era (see Tables 2-4) . Because these three institutions are the most important advisory bodies of the HKSAR government, the overrepresentation of the business sector has illustrated the post-colonial state's attempt to follow in the footsteps of its predecessor to consolidate its governance and mediate state-society relations by extensively co-opting business elites.
While the post-colonial state has largely followed its colonial predecessor in engineering a state-business alliance, state-society relations in the HKSAR era have become increasingly conflictual. This paper argues that the rising level of state-society conflicts in post-colonial Hong Kong is not only the result of growing civil society activism, as pointed out by the existing literature. 39 This rise is also a demonstration of the powerlessness of the postcolonial state and its business allies in accommodating societal challenges. In this regard, the erosion of the intermediary role of the business elites is the principal reason for the declining capacity of the post-colonial state to resist the challenges of civil society.
There are three important reasons behind the growing disconnection of the business sector from the local community. First, the co-opted business elites have limited community networks and little connection with newly emerging civil society; therefore, unlike in the British colonial era, they are no longer considered by the public to be leaders of the community. During the colonial era, particularly before the 1970s, local Chinese capitalists were widely seen as the ''natural leaders'' of the Chinese community owing to their high credibility, prestige, and the community networks they had developed through their personal service in various district and welfare Author's own research, based on the list of unofficial members provided by the Executive Council Secretariat. organizations. However, the political networks of business elites have become increasingly obsolete since the 1970s, as a result of the gradual expansion of the Hong Kong government's role in the provision of social services. As such, the co-opted business elites have become increasingly remote from district and welfare organizations.
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Unfortunately, most business elites have not yet realized the negative impact of their increasing disconnection from the community and have done nothing to re-establish such connections with the community by participating in mass politics. The underdevelopment of business-oriented political parties and their limited community networks is most illuminating. Because of their privileged access to political powers like chief executive election committees and functional constituencies in the Legislative Council, business elites are generally reluctant to get involved in popular elections, and their attitude toward organizing and sponsoring political parties has remained very negative.
41 As such, business-oriented parties are underdeveloped and remain very much elite parties with limited community networks and insufficient Ibid. to Table 3 .
power of mass mobilization. 42 Table 5 shows that compared with other political parties, the community networks of business-oriented political parties including the LP and ES are particularly weak in terms of their limited number of district offices and district councillors. In the face of the rise of civil society activism in recent years, most of the business elites remain ignorant of the values and policy agenda of social activists; they are generally out of touch with newly emerging civil society groups.
43 As a result of their limited community networks and connections with civil society, unlike in the British colonial era, the co-opted business elites can no longer be considered leaders of the community. In fact, they rarely possess recognizable political identities. It is therefore not surprising that in times of large-scale social movements, the co-opted business elites are powerless in mobilizing public opinion support and defending the policy decisions of the post-colonial state. Second, growing public suspicions of ''government-business collusion'' in recent years have created negative images for the business sector, eroding the credibility of co-opted business elites in the public eye. After 1997, there were growing public concerns that government officials provided preferential treatment for big businesses on several controversial projects (e.g., construction of Cyberport, the development of the West Kowloon Cultural District, and the sale of Hunghom Peninsula). The credibility of government officials and the business sector was severely challenged over these incidents. 45 As such, there are growing public suspicions of ''government-business collusion, '' 46 and people are dissatisfied with the dominance of ''real estate hegemony.'' 47 In recent years, suspicions of such collusion have even sparked an anti-business sentiment within society, resulting in a public discourse against the business sector (see Figure 2) . This discourse has left a growing number of people with negative impressions of business leaders, who are seen as untrustworthy, profit-oriented, politically conservative, and not respectable (see Table 6 ). Thus, unlike the British colonial era when the co-opted business elites were widely seen as ''respectable intermediaries'' representing the Chinese community and helping the colonial state to carry local opinion, 48 the public image of business leaders has become extremely negative.
49 As a result, instead of mobilizing societal support for the post-colonial state, co-opted business elites struggle to earn the respect of Hong Kong people. The endorsement of co-opted business elites on a government initiative has even sparked counterproductive results and become the target of public criticism. Finally, the business sector's longstanding ideological weapon of ''economism'' has grown increasingly out of touch with the public; thus, the coopted business elites struggle to defend the pro-business policy agenda in the public sphere. In the colonial era, the discourse of economism, which emphasized the importance of economic growth and its contribution to the improvement of people's livelihoods, perpetuated the domination of the state-business alliance. By reinforcing the idea that the general public would be better off under the free market and everyone could move up the social ladder through hard work, the ideology of economism sustained public acceptance for pro-business policies and neutralized social inequalities.
50 However, in recent years Hong Kong economic growth has been coupled with the trend of growing income disparity. Since its transformation into an international financial and business services center in the 1990s, Hong Kong has been characterized by dual social structures where the incomes of high-skilled manager-professionals and low-skilled basic workers have become polarized.
51 As income inequality becomes a structural rather than a cyclical phenomenon in Hong Kong, more and more people begin to doubt that pro-business policies and free market capitalism are really good for the whole society (see Table 7 ). As such, the political narrative of economism is becoming less appealing to the public and less effective in countering civil society's growing demands for social justice.
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The gradual erosion of the discourse of economism has undermined the credibility of co-opted business elites and deprived them of an important ideological weapon to defend and justify the pro-business policies of the post-colonial state. Although the preceding discussions have clearly illustrated the erosion of the intermediary role of business elites after 1997, in establishing the powerlessness of the post-colonial state to accommodate civil society activism, we need to qualify one potential important factor: the role of pro-Beijing leftists in mediating state-society relations. As shown in Table 5 above, although the community networks of business-oriented political parties including the LP and the ES are obviously weak, pro-Beijing political parties, namely the DAB and the HKFTU have maintained extensive local networks. Therefore, one important question we must answer is the following: Why does the postcolonial state, given the erosion of the intermediary role of the business elites, not turn to the pro-Beijing parties for support and make use of their community networks to mediate its relations with society?
There are three key factors that significantly hinder the pro-Beijing leftists from playing a bridging function between the post-colonial state and civil society. Firstly, the pro-Beijing leftists from the DAB and the HKFTU were only marginal actors in the post-colonial governing coalition. Going back to the mid-1980s, Beijing leaders had already decided to engineer a governing coalition with business elites forming the core of the alliance and the leftists playing only a marginal role.
53 Such a governing strategy was largely followed With no real executive power in terms of cabinet positions and no actual influence in the policy-making process, the DAB and the HKFTU are generally incapable of aggregating and channeling social interests.
55 As a consequence of such a loose partnership between the post-colonial state and the pro-Beijing leftists, the DAB and the HKFTU have played a marginal role in mediating state-society relations, making the intermediary role of business elites an overriding factor that determines the capacity of the post-colonial state to accommodate social challenges.
Second, the community networks forged by the pro-Beijing leftists have their own limitations. The DAB and the HKFTU have established an extensive network of united front organizations covering trade unions, neighborhood bodies, and youth and women groups, and such unitedfront machinery has occasionally been rolled out post-1997 to support the post-colonial state in times of major political controversy. Still, the grassroots orientation and politically conservative outlook of the leftist organizations have made them basically disconnected from the middle class and particularly the newly emerged civil society organizations. For this reason, the DAB and the HKFTU have proved ineffective in mobilizing mainstream public opinion support for the post-colonial state.
56 Third, similar to all other pro-democracy and pro-government parties in Hong Kong, the DAB and the HKFTU operate within an atmosphere of public skepticism of party politics. 57. In Hong Kong, people's negative impression of party politics is closely related to various obstacles that hinder the development of political parties. It is an open secret that the Chinese government does not want to see vibrant party politics in Hong Kong, and in fact the HKSAR Chief Executive is prohibited by Section 31 of the Chief Executive Election Ordinance from being a member of a political party, making it impossible to form a governing party in Hong Kong. Therefore, unlike political parties in Western democracies, parties in Hong Kong are only active in the Legislative Council, and cannot exercise any real influence on delivering governance and steering policy-making. Under such circumstances, the public has gradually gained an impression that political parties only engage in endless rhetorical battles within the legislature or merely made themselves non-partisan and both the DAB and the HKFTU have commanded only very low support ratings in opinion polls (see Table 8 ), the post-colonial state simply could not rely on the pro-Beijing leftists to engineer a social support base for its governance.
To sum up, because of the erosion of the intermediary role of the business elites (and also the limited role of the pro-Beijing leftists in mediating statesociety relations), even though the post-colonial state can still press through its policies by resorting to the pro-government majority in the Legislative Council (i.e., the support of business-professional legislators from the functional constituencies and pro-Beijing leftist legislators), it cannot rely on the support of co-opted business elites to manage the rising challenges of civil society activism and mobilize sufficient social support for its governance. In times of growing state-society conflict, co-opted business elites are generally powerless in bridging the widening gap between the post-colonial state and civil society.
The Case of the Express Rail Link
The controversies surrounding the construction of the Hong Kong section of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link in 2009-10 (hereafter, Express Rail Link) illustrate how the growing disconnection of business elites has undermined the capacity of the post-colonial state in accommodating the challenges of civil society. Connecting Hong Kong with the national high-speed rail network, construction of the Express Rail Link is supposed to bring enormous benefits to Hong Kong's socioeconomic development and foster its integration with the Mainland. 58 However, the Express Rail Link project has attracted strong opposition from some villagers from the Choi Yuen Tsuen (Village), who refused to move out of their homes to make way for the construction work. These villagers, together with a group of heritage activists, launched a series of social movements to voice their opposition to the construction project. The protests organized by the Choi Yuen villagers and the heritage activists successfully aroused public attention on the Express Rail Link project. The alternative rail route proposal 59 put forth by the Professional Commons, a think-tank formed by professionals such as lawyers, engineers, accountants, and academics, added further doubts to the cost effectiveness of the Donald Tsang administration's proposal. By the end of 2009, there had been an important change in public opinion, with polls showing that more and more people expressed reservations about the project. 60. According to an opinion poll conducted by the University of Hong Kong in January 2010, 47% of respondents supported the Hong Kong government's funding proposals for the Express Rail Link. However, 23% of respondents opposed the funding proposals, and another 22% wanted to put In the face of widespread public concern about the Express Rail Link project, the Tsang administration tried to counter the civil society opposition campaigns by mobilizing the support of its business allies. The Executive Council approved the Express Rail Link project on October 20, 2009, and those unofficial Executive Councillors with business backgrounds gave highprofile support to the project by highlighting its potential economic benefits. 61 The Mass Transit Railway Corporation, an alliance of 67 business chambers and the major business associations, also placed full-page newspaper advertisements calling on the public to support the project.
62 With the support votes of business and professional legislators returned by functional constituencies, the Tsang administration finally secured the endorsement of the Legislative Council Finance Committee to approve the relevant funding proposals in January 2010.
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While the support of business elites in both the Executive Council and the Legislative Council allowed the Donald Tsang administration to successfully push through the Express Rail Link proposal, it did not help establish broad societal support for the project within the wider community. The co-opted business elites, due to their limited community networks and disconnection from the civil society organizations, were generally powerless in bridging the gap between the post-colonial state and the anti-Express Rail Link activists. is handicapped by its narrowly based, loose governing coalition with the business sector. Unlike their colonial predecessors, business elites after 1997 no longer command the necessary community networks, public reputation, and ideological weapons to mediate state-society relations. While Hong Kong was moving over the past few decades toward a hybrid regime featuring a limited electoral franchise, strong civil liberties, and an increasingly active civil society, the post-colonial state and its business allies were slow to reengineer their governing coalition to accommodate the changing political environment. Their failure to organize the ruling elites into a cohesive governing party, establish connectedness with newly emergent civil society groups, develop community networks, and sharpen their political discourse has made the state-business alliance too vulnerable in the face of the rising civil society activism. Unlike other hybrid regimes, Hong Kong's status as an autonomous region under Chinese sovereignty has made its regime distinctively resilient; with the strong support of Beijing it is very unlikely to collapse in the foreseeable future. 69 Still, Hong Kong remains intrinsically unstable and has been trapped in growing state-society conflict. The failure of the postcolonial state to engineer a viable governing coalition has made it difficult to accommodate the challenges of civil society and to forge a stable political support base for consolidating governance.
The discussions in this paper illuminate our understanding of the governance crisis in post-colonial Hong Kong. Currently, a legitimacy deficit is the most popular explanation adopted by local political scientists when accounting for the HKSAR governance crisis. 70 Such a mainstream perspective emphasizes that the challenges of the democrats and civil society have undermined the legitimacy of the post-colonial state and plunged it into a serious governance crisis. To use the words of Levitsky and Way, the notion of a legitimacy deficit is fundamentally an opposition-centered explanation. This focuses too strongly on the role of societal factors while largely overlooking the relevance of the organizational weaknesses of the post-colonial state when explaining the HKSAR governance crisis. From this perspective, this paper makes an important, original contribution to the local literature by going beyond the existing opposition-centered explanation as highlighted by the theorists of legitimacy deficit. The paper offers an alternative, state-centric perspective to examine the robustness of the state in the discussion of the HKSAR governance crisis. By establishing the causal relationship between the failure to build governing coalitions and the increasing state-society conflicts, this paper demonstrates that the post-colonial state's weak capacity to accommodate the challenges of civil society has added fuel to the governance crisis in the HKSAR era. In order to provide a more comprehensive account of the post-handover governance crisis, the state-centric perspective should be used in conjunction with the opposition-centered explanation to examine and interpret the changing balance of power between the post-colonial state and the opposition forces.
